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EVERGREEN OR DECIDUOUS? AUSTRALIAN TRENDS 
IN RELATION TO THE ‘EVERGREENING’ OF PATENTS 
ROBERT CHALMERS∗ 
[The so-called ‘evergreening’ of pharmaceutical patents has become an issue of major public 
concern in the wake of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement and the amendments it 
requires to the Therapeutics Goods Act 1989 (Cth). The effect of these amendments was to place 
additional obligations on manufacturers of generic (unpatented) pharmaceuticals. Some additional 
provisions were also included in an attempt to safeguard against potentially ‘illegitimate’ patent 
infringement action taken by patentees against such manufacturers. This article examines these 
provisions and their likely effect on the patent protection strategies adopted by the pharmaceutical 
industry. It also considers recent responses to these strategies by the patents administration system 
and the courts — in particular, the decision of Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Merck & Co Inc.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
‘Evergreening’ refers to the strategy adopted by patentees who seek to extend 
their period of patent protection by applying for secondary patents over related 
or derivative technologies. At first blush, the idea of evergreening seems an 
anathema to central tenets of the patent system, which provide protection for a 
limited term to ‘novel’ inventions. Accordingly, the practice of evergreening has 
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been criticised as effectively enabling protection beyond the initial term despite 
only trivial changes to the invention itself. Multinational pharmaceutical 
companies are most frequently accused of abusing the patent system in this way, 
and it was this concern that prompted such debate and interest in the lead-up to 
Australia’s implementation of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agree-
ment1 and during the 2004 federal election campaign. 
The AUSFTA made much more extensive alterations to copyright law than to 
the patent system. The duration of many copyrights was extended by a further 20 
years2 — the full term of a patent — a change much more amenable to the 
charge of evergreening than corresponding changes to patent law. Nevertheless, 
the changes to copyright did not capture the public’s imagination in the same 
way, even though their consequences would be felt far more profoundly in the 
future. Rather, it was the changes to patents and therapeutic goods regulation that 
received widespread public and media attention. The availability and cost of 
pharmaceuticals are issues that have much greater visceral impact upon the 
public than access to and use of copyright works. 
This recent attention in the Australian media reflects global concern about the 
manner in which the patent system is to strike a balance between the interests of 
inventors and the general public. On the one hand, incentives must exist for 
‘pioneering’ or ‘originator’ drug companies to innovate. On the other hand, 
regard must be had for competing manufacturers of generic products (‘generics 
companies’) in order to facilitate their simultaneous creation of new therapies 
and efficient production of older drugs. This is, of course, not a concern isolated 
to Australia. Such issues, and concerns over potential abuses of evergreening, are 
widespread throughout the global community, including in the United States.3 
However, the balance is struck differently in each jurisdiction.4 Unsurprisingly, 
some countries — notably those with a significant pioneering drug sector — are 
more favourably inclined to protect originator interests, whereas others — 
especially countries with poorer health and financial positions, and those with a 
significant generics industry — are less inclined. Additionally, world trade 
agreements are layered on top of all those interests and related debates have been 
playing out inside the Doha round of negotiations of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (‘WTO’) in recent years. 
This article reviews evergreening practices and related laws from an Australian 
perspective. First, it analyses the strategy and practice of evergreening in 
Australia, before outlining the backdrop provided by pre-existing patent and 
 
 1 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 (entered into force 1 January 2005) 
(‘AUSFTA’). 
 2 Ibid art 17.4.4. 
 3 See, eg, discussion of the United States Federal Commission’s 2002 inquiry into evergreening 
abuses: Thomas Faunce, ‘The Awful Truth about Evergreening’, The Age (Melbourne), 7 August 
2004, 9. 
 4 See, eg, the comparative regulatory discussion in Anita Nador and Melanie Szweras, Comparing 
Canadian Notice of Compliance (NOC) Regulations for Patented Medicines with Corresponding 
United States and European Union Provisions (4 March 2002) Bereskin and Parr Intellectual 
Property Law <http://www.bereskinparr.com/English/publications/art_html/bio-noc-regul-nador. 
html>. Although these jurisdictions differ considerably in their approaches, they are more ho-
mogenous than others. 
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Therapeutic Goods Administration (‘TGA’) systems. It then examines the 
changes introduced by the AUSFTA, identifying both ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-’ evergreen-
ing elements, and considers the effect of several recent cases. 
The ‘pro-evergreening’ elements of the AUSFTA extend protection by creating 
peripheral mechanisms rather than making fundamental changes to patent laws. 
Specifically, the mechanisms introduce regulatory ‘data exclusivity’ and impose 
tightened controls over advertising by generics companies. The core obligation 
imposed by these changes is to require those seeking to market pharmaceuticals 
to certify their products as ‘patent-friendly’, under threat of significant penalty. 
As will be seen, the original provisions of the US Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act 2004 (Cth) have already had to be amended to ameliorate unin-
tended side effects for the ‘over-the-counter’ and complementary medicine 
sectors, where compliance costs were raised without any real benefit for con-
sumers. 5  The ‘anti-evergreening’ provisions are also unlikely to have any 
significant effect. To the extent that they do prove to have teeth, they are likely 
to be ‘pulled’ at the insistence of the US, which indicated its grave reservations 
about their inclusion in the amending legislation. 
There is clearly a large financial incentive for drug companies to push the 
boundary of protection systems, so it seems likely that evergreening in one form 
or another will continue. In light of Australia’s obligations under the AUSFTA, 
legislative intervention appears unlikely. Consequently, the primary checks and 
balances on subversive evergreening practices in Australia remain those provided 
by IP Australia and the courts. Case law is, of course, very fact specific (as it 
must be). It is therefore difficult to draw any coherent principles from the 
decisions. Some courts continue to exhibit serious reservations about patenting 
methods of medical treatment — sometimes on philosophical grounds and 
especially where they perceive no real technical innovation but rather legal 
artifice. Other decisions, particularly those by appellate courts, appear quite 
‘patent-friendly’ and seem less inclined to refuse protection unless a product or 
process clearly lacks novelty (attacks on ‘obviousness’ proving more problem-
atic). Overall, the proprietarian trend in intellectual property seems set to 
continue, with evergreening of pharmaceutical patents providing merely one 
more example. 
I I   PATENT STRATEGIES  — EVERGREENING IN  ACTION? 
Clearly, it is fundamental to the patent system that applications relate to new 
inventions. However, in the context of pharmaceutical patents, the practice of 
evergreening does not simply refer to extending the original patent, but also 
includes strategies and practices used to protect a cluster of related, but arguably 
unoriginal, technologies through the filing of secondary applications. For 
example, a patentee may seek protection for novel uses of a drug, or new 
methods of administering or producing it, prior to the expiry of the original 
substance patent. The effect is to ‘reset the clock’ on the patentee’s protection 
period, excluding potential competitors from the marketplace for another full 
 
 5 See below Part IV(D)(4).  
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term. Generic drug companies, for example, are forced to decide whether to 
delay entry of their own products, challenge the secondary patent, or design 
around it. 
With a number of ‘blockbuster’ substance patents due for expiry within the 
next few years, this practice has received a considerable amount of attention, 
both within and outside the pharmaceutical industry. As it is phrased in an article 
by Michael Burdon and Kristie Sloper: 
In an environment where there is ever increasing pressure on innovator phar-
maceutical companies to maximise return on investment and where share val-
ues may be substantially affected by court decisions in patent litigation between 
pharmaceutical innovators and generic companies, a key element of pharma-
ceutical life cycle management strategies is to extend patent protection for as 
long as possible by filing secondary patents to keep generics off the market.6 
Burdon and Sloper’s article reviews the United Kingdom case law and at-
tempts to extrapolate several lessons for ‘the development of a credible life cycle 
management strategy.’7 The article concludes that: 
secondary patents can be useful in extending patent protection in certain cases. 
Although it has often proved difficult to maintain the validity of such patents 
before the UK courts it is by no means impossible and there have been some 
significant victories for patentees in the UK courts in cases involving secon-
dary patents in recent years. … 
Even where the final outcome of proceedings is that the patent is held invalid, 
the effect of the litigation will have been to delay the generics’ entry to the 
market. Fighting the litigation may also have ‘warned off’ other generic com-
petition. In any event, for a successful product, the benefit of even a short time 
of additional proprietary sales may easily outweigh the costs of patent litiga-
tion.8 
Similarly, it is instructive to consider various comments included in presenta-
tions by Andrew Teuten of Sagittarius Intellectual Property Consultants Ltd: 
‘These days 20 years of patent life is not enough; there is a need to make 
protection “longer and stronger”’.9 Such protection is further defined to include 
measures such as making best use of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property,10 the ‘patent term guarantee’ in the US and statutory patent 
term extension,11 and taking advantage of opportunities for secondary patents as 
well as regulatory data exclusivity.12  
 
 6 Michael Burdon and Kristie Sloper, ‘The Art of Using Secondary Patents to Improve Protection’ 
(2003) 3 International Journal of Medical Marketing 226, 226. 
 7 Ibid 228. 
 8 Ibid 238. 
 9 Andrew Teuten, ‘Strategies for Extending the Period of Exclusivity of a Pharmaceutical Product’ 
(Paper presented at the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Patenting IBC USA Conference, Paris, 27 
January 2004) [slide 2] <http://www.sagittariusipc.co.uk/AT_presentation_Jan04.pdf>. 
 10 Opened for signature 20 March 1883, 828 UNTS 305 (entered into force 19 May 1970). 
 11 See, eg, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 15 USC  
§§ 68b–68c, 70b (1994); 21 USC §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 USC § 2201 (1994); 35 
USC §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994) (‘Hatch-Waxman Act’) which provides for term extension for drug 
patents. The Australian laws provide more limited protection: see below Part IV(A)(1). See also 
Gerald J Mossinghoff, ‘Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its Impact on the Drug Devel-
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Teuten notes the controversial nature of secondary patents ‘such as new poly-
morphs, salts, formulations, processes, uses etc’,13 but canvasses their advan-
tages in extending the overall period of protection, and the dissuasive effect on 
generic drug companies. He comments further on the potential unattractiveness 
of designing around existing patents, which, even if technically feasible, may 
confront regulatory hurdles in trying to establish ‘bio-equivalency’ with the 
originator product.14 It is this combination of strategies — in particular, an astute 
package of secondary patents and exclusivity over regulatory data — that Teuten 
refers to as ‘total product protection’.15 While he does caution as to the probabil-
ity of validity challenges if secondary patents extend protection beyond the basic 
term (and the fact that they provide a target to be further designed around) he 
nonetheless concludes that such protection can be very valuable, a similar 
conclusion to that reached in the paper by Burdon and Sloper.  
One example of the successful use of evergreening strategies to obtain ex-
tended protection is GlaxoSmithKline’s version of the antidepressant, paroxetine. 
The ‘base’ patent expired in the late 1990s, but ancillary patents covering new 
forms, tablets, uses and processes will not expire until between 2006 and 2018.16  
It seems uncontroversial that there is a significant incentive — indeed, signifi-
cant commercial pressure — on the pharmaceutical industry to adopt whatever 
legitimate tactics it can to effectively extend monopoly rights. Further, it is 
undeniable that the industry does indeed adopt these practices in an attempt to 
‘evergreen’, using that expression in a broad sense. 17  Some of the tactics 
employed have been mentioned briefly above, though there are of course many 
others.18 The ingenuity of technical, patent and legal advisers will ensure that the 
options available continue to expand. While most of the authorities referenced 
above in relation to evergreening strategies are international, this reflects the 
nature of the global pharmaceutical industry, especially the so-called originator 
sector. Similar tactics are adopted in Australia, with adaptation to local circum-
stances and laws as appropriate. 
 
opment Process’ (1999) 54 Food and Drug Law Journal 187. See generally ‘Symposium: Strik-
ing the Right Balance between Innovation and Drug Price Competition — Understanding the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’ (1999) 54 Food and Drug Law Journal 185. For a discussion of US ever-
greening practice (and abuse), see Lara J Glasgow, ‘Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?’ (2001) 41 IDEA: The Journal of Law 
and Technology 227. 
 12 See Teuten, above n 9, [slide 3]. 
 13 Ibid 1. 
 14 For a discussion on the US procedures for obtaining regulatory approval for generic drugs, 
including the requirement that a generics company demonstrate bio-equivalency with the origi-
nal drug, see below Part III(B). 
 15 Teuten, above n 9, [slide 3]. 
 16 Mike Hutchins, ‘Using Interlocking Additional Early Stage Patents to Improve and Extend 
Patent Protection’ (2003) 3 International Journal of Medical Marketing 212, 215. 
 17 See, eg, David Uren, ‘Drug Industry Has Plenty of Dodges, That’s Patently Obvious — Trade in 
the Balance’, The Australian (Sydney), 5 August 2004, 4. 
 18 The subject matter of other secondary pharmaceutical patents has included isomers, pill-mixing, 
changed indications, drug–device combinations, tablets and special coatings. 
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III   PRE-EXISTING LAW 
A  Australia 
Prior to the introduction of the AUSFTA it was already possible to engage in 
so-called evergreening and indeed to seek an extension of protection for the 
terms of the base patent. Limited term extension for drug patents has been a 
feature of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) since 1998,19 with the ability to apply for 
extensions of up to five years for pharmaceutical substance patents. 20  This 
specific extension is regarded as some compensation for the extended regulatory 
approval process and safety trials to which new drugs are subjected, and is a 
common element of many patent systems. However, this extension was never 
available for a ‘use’ claim. This limitation stemmed from an interpretation by the 
Federal Court of Australia of the meaning of the phrase ‘pharmaceutical per se’ 
in Boehringer Ingelheim International v Commissioner of Patents.21 Australian 
Patent Office procedures now explicitly reflect this, including some specific 
examples of claims to which applications for term extensions will be rejected as 
non-compliant.22 
The application of these provisions was the subject of a recent hearing before 
the Deputy Commissioner of Patents in Application by Pfizer Inc.23 In this case, 
the Patent Office refused an application for extension of term in relation to a 
patent on a general class of chemical compounds. One example within this class 
(voriconazole, which apparently had surprising properties not evident from the 
general class of compounds discussed in the first patent specification) had been 
the subject of a divisional selection patent24 from the patent in question, and that 
patent had already been granted a term extension. It was held that the current 
application could not meet the requirement of Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 70(2)(a) 
that the relevant compound be disclosed in substance in the patent.25 The Deputy 
Commissioner believed that there would be a fundamental difficulty if the parent 
standard patent did disclose the substance claimed by the divisional application, 
 
 19 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) sch 1 div 2. 
 20 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 70–9A. 
 21 [2001] AIPC ¶91-670. An appeal from this decision was dismissed in Boehringer Ingelheim 
International GmbH v Commissioner of Patents (2001) 112 FCR 595. 
 22 For details of patent extension grounds, see Australian Patent Office, Manual of Practice and 
Procedure (vol 3) (April 2006) IP Australia [3.23.2.2] <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/ 
patentsmanual/WebHelp/Patent_Examiners_Manual.htm> which provides: ‘Examples of claims 
that are not directed to substances per se are … use of substance X in the treatment of Y’. 
 23 (2004) 62 IPR 627. 
 24 Divisional applications are dealt with in Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ch 6A. They permit a further 
complete application for an invention disclosed in the original application, provided that this is 
made, in the case of an original standard patent, prior to the grant of the original application: 
s 79B(1). Divisional applications may also be made from an innovation patent application and 
these can be made following the grant of that application, as long as they are made within the 
prescribed time: s 79C. 
 25 The section in question provides that ‘one or more pharmaceutical substances per se must in 
substance be disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within the 
scope of the claim or claims of that specification’: Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 70(2)(a). 
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as prima facie this would have deprived the selection patent of the requisite 
element of novelty for patentability, subject to additional evidence.26  
However, this element of the decision was overturned on appeal in Pfizer 
Inc v Commissioner of Patents,27 and the matter was remitted to the Commis-
sioner of Patents for further determination. Bennett J found that the Deputy 
Commissioner had effectively and inappropriately taken into account the 
selection patent in the construction of the parent patent. In contrast, Bennett J 
decided that ‘the selection patent either by reason of its existence or as evidence 
in the construction of the parent patent for the purpose of ascertaining disclosure 
within the meaning of s 70(2)(a), was irrelevant.’28 His Honour further com-
mented: 
There may have been reasons why the patentee chose to file a second patent 
instead of seeking to amend the parent patent to include a specific claim to 
voriconazole. However, those issues play no part in the determination of 
whether s 70(2)(a) is satisfied, in the same way that issues of invalidity for lack 
of novelty or obviousness play no part in the determination of fair basis of the 
claims on the matter described in the specification.29 
Warwick A Rothnie has described this outcome as a ‘peculiar form of double 
dipping (perhaps bootstrapping rather than evergreening)’.30 
In any event, a patentee may of course seek protection for further inventions, 
which might include claims to new uses for existing products. Obviously each 
new application must meet all the requirements for patentability in its own right, 
and will only receive protection to the extent its claims are valid. As Karin Innes 
states, ‘[p]atent evergreening will still be permitted to the extent that it does not 
transgress the law.’31 She asserts that the practice of evergreening was ‘effec-
tively endorsed’ 32  by the High Court of Australia in Aktiebolaget 
Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd.33 
At a technical level, this may seem to be overstating the effect of the case, 
which did not explicitly refer to evergreening and on its face was more con-
cerned with the proper process to be undertaken in determining the issue of 
 
 26 Application by Pfizer Inc (2004) 62 IPR 627, 634 (Deputy Commissioner Herald). Note that 
Deputy Commissioner Herald found that the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) did not preclude the exten-
sion of term of more than one patent based on a single registration under the Australian Register 
of Therapeutic Goods: at 629. 
 27 (2005) 141 FCR 413. 
 28 Ibid 420. 
 29 Ibid 421 (citations omitted). Note that Bennett J was not assessing issues of validity in relation 
to the selection patent. See also Imperial Chemicals Industries Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pat-
ents (2004) 63 IPR 476 for the potential impact of such a situation on novelty. This case also 
involved a patent within the scope of a previous patent on the relevant general class of chemical 
compounds. An appeal against its rejection by the Patent Office was allowed: at 494–5 (Cren-
nan J). 
 30 Warwick A Rothnie, Extending the Selected beyond the Extension (8 March 2005) IPwar’s 
Patents <http://homepage.mac.com/wrothnie/iblog/C149316833/E2145394282/index.html>. 
 31 Karin Innes, ‘The Impact of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement on Pharmaceuti-
cal Patents’ (July 2005) Blake Dawson Waldron: Life Sciences Update 7 <http://www.bdw.com. 
au/publications/lifescience/lifescience072005.pdf>. 
 32 Ibid. 
 33 (2002) 212 CLR 411. 
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‘inventive step’.34 In a practical sense, however, the comment is accurate: the 
High Court decision overturned the ‘anti-evergreening’ approaches of lower 
courts. For example, the Federal Court had found the Losec patent — which did 
not claim the active substance (for which a prior patent had expired) but rather a 
coating system — to be obvious.35 The majority of the High Court disagreed, 
allowing continued protection of the drug in question, despite it being noted to 
have cost the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme over $141 million in the 1997–98 
financial year. 36  However, there were some strong dissents from Kirby and 
McHugh JJ. Kirby J noted that the finding of obviousness was consistent with 
the approach of Laddie J on essentially the same subject matter in Cairnstores 
Ltd v Aktiebolaget Hässle.37 
Another important decision in the field of secondary patents — in this case 
relating to a use patent — is that of the Full Federal Court in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd.38 This was an appeal from the judgment of 
Heerey J in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding & Co Ltd 39 in relation to a 
petty patent for a more efficient method of administering an anti-cancer drug. At 
first instance, Heerey J revoked the patent on various grounds, most controver-
sially that it was a method of treatment, the patenting of which would be 
generally inconvenient. 40  Heerey J quoted Cooke J: ‘“there remains … a 
deep-seated sense that the art of the physician or the surgeon in alleviating 
human suffering does not belong to the area of economic endeavour or trade and 
commerce.”’41 
The Full Federal Court dismissed the appeal but reversed Heerey J’s decision 
on the method of medical treatment issue,42 instead affirming the majority view 
from Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd.43 
It is also possible to attempt to evergreen by filing innovation patents, which 
require a lower level of ‘innovative step’, rather than the same level of inven-
tiveness required of standard patents. The term of protection is lower, but such 
patents can be used for ‘secondary’ protection of incremental innovation, or to 
enable ready enforcement by means of a divisional filing, pending grant of a 
parent standard patent. 
The preceding analysis illustrates that, while not always successful, pharma-
ceutical companies often attempted to take advantage of the pre-AUSFTA 
Australian patent regime in order to engage in evergreening. In Part V, this article 
will consider in greater detail recent judicial criticism of one such attempt, Arrow 
 
 34 Ibid 436–8 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
 35 Aktiebolaget Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2000) 51 IPR 375. 
 36 Aktiebolaget Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411, 449 (Kirby J). 
 37 Ibid 450. See Cairnstores Ltd v Aktiebolaget Hässle [2002] EWHC 309 (Ch) (Unreported, 
Laddie J, 6 March 2002). 
 38 (2000) 97 FCR 524 (‘Faulding’). 
 39 (1998) 41 IPR 467. 
 40  Ibid 479–82. 
 41  Ibid 481, citing Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 385, 388 
(Cooke J). 
 42 Faulding (2000) 97 FCR 524, 529–30 (Black CJ and Lehane J), 569–70 (Finkelstein J). 
 43 (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
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Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Merck & Co Inc,44 as well as briefly look at some other 
current Australian decisions. 
B  United States 
This article will not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of US 
evergreening practices and laws.45 However, it is important to appreciate the 
basic principles governing the US system — in particular the Hatch-Waxman 
Act46 — in order to understand the US negotiating position and the basis for the 
changes introduced by the AUSFTA. It is certainly true that the Australian 
regulatory framework is far from identical to its US counterpart. However, the 
US approach remains important in Australia, notwithstanding the protestations of 
domestic trade negotiators that it has successfully resisted introducing a 
Hatch-Waxman type system into Australian law.47 
Like Australia, debates have taken place in the US about the dangers of ever-
greening and have attempted to strike a balance between the interests of origina-
tor and generics drug companies. This is done primarily within the framework of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act. This Act introduces a procedure for obtaining regulatory 
approval for generic drugs. An ‘abbreviated new drug application’ (‘ANDA’) can 
be made to the US Food and Drug Administration (‘FDA’) by generic drug 
manufacturers seeking approval for the release of their competing drugs. The 
rationale underlying this system is that if the original drug had already received 
regulatory approval then, in order to gain marketing approval for their drugs, all 
a generics company should be required to do is to demonstrate bio-equivalency 
with the original drug — that is to say, an identical biological effect — rather 
than demonstrate safety and efficacy independently.  
To balance the interests of the originator industry, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
requires ANDA lodgements to make one of four certifications in relation to the 
patent status of the competing generic drug. The options are: 
(a) the drug is not patented; 
(b) relevant patents have expired; 
(c) relevant patents will expire by the time the generics drug hits the market; or 
(d) the patent won’t be infringed or is invalid.48 
The certification made by the ANDA applicant essentially provides a form of 
early warning system for the primary patentees, who can then seek an injunction 
to prevent the release of products which they believe are in violation of their 
patent claims. 
 
 44 (2004) 63 IPR 85 (‘Arrow v Merck’). 
 45 For further information in relation to the United States systems, see references in above n 11. 
 46 15 USC §§ 68b–68c, 70b (1994); 21 USC §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 USC § 2201 
(1994); 35 USC §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994). 
 47 See, eg, Evidence to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia 
and the United States of America, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 21 June 2004, 46, 48, 58 
(Stephen Deady). 
 48 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 355(b)(2)(A) (2004). 
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In order to compile a centralised list of patents to which a generics competitor 
should have regard when making the required certifications, the so-called 
‘Orange Book’ was created. The Orange Book contains this listing, to which the 
originator industry essentially adds in a self-nominating fashion. In theory, 
maintaining the list in a ‘closed’ form improves certainty for generics manufac-
turers. However, it now appears that the benefits of a more confined list have 
been eroded by astute use of the system by patent attorneys familiar with how to 
best combine patent drafting, filing and Orange Book listing: ‘With a greater 
understanding of how Hatch-Waxman and the patent laws interrelate, patent 
agents and attorneys can help maximize the future earnings of their clients’ drug 
patents.’49 
The Hatch-Waxman Act contains several other important elements. First, it 
makes provision for periods of data exclusivity (for example, to an originator 
listing a new molecular entity). Second, it also grants patentees a more expedi-
tious mechanism for obtaining stays on generic product releases. Finally, it 
further provides for term extensions in order to make up for delays caused by 
regulatory processes.50 Overall, while the Hatch-Waxman Act was not stacked 
completely in favour of the originator drug company interests, its basic structure 
— especially as it came to be used over time — is on balance friendly to that 
sector. 
In 2003, several amendments to the Act were made by the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.51 The relevant provi-
sions are contained in Title XI, ‘Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals’. One of 
the changes introduced was to correct abuses made possible where an innovator 
company progressively ‘late-listed’ patents in the Orange Book, creating 
successive 30-month stays on generic product releases in the event of related 
litigation, effectively stalling generic competition.52 Another change provides a 
mechanism for an ANDA applicant that has been sued for patent infringement to 
counterclaim for correction or deletion of patents listed in the Orange Book.53 
 
 49 Terry G Mahn, ‘Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues during the Claims 
Drafting Process’ (1999) 54 Food and Drug Law Journal 245, 253. 
 50 For further discussion of the important and complex issue of data exclusivity, see, eg, Elizabeth 
H Dickinson, ‘FDA’s Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations’ (1999) 54 Food and Drug 
Law Journal 195. 
 51 Pub L No 108-173, 117 Stat 2066. For a brief discussion of its features, see, eg, Richard J 
Berman and Janine A Carlan, ‘Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act by the Recently Enacted 
Medicare Law: New Considerations for “Paragraph IV” Litigation’ (23 December 2003) Arent 
Fox: Alert <http://www.arentfox.com/legal_updates/icontent493.pdf>. 
 52 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub L No 108-173, 
§ 1101, 117 Stat 2066, 2448. 
 53 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub L No 108-173, 
§ 1101, 117 Stat 2066, 2448. 
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IV  THE AUSFTA  AND ITS  IMPLEMENTATION 
A  AUSFTA 
There is no radical change mandated by patent elements of the AUSFTA,54 and 
in particular little that relates to potential evergreening. Most of the AUSFTA 
patent requirements simply reinforce aspects of the WTO’s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights55 and pre-existing patent 
law and practice in Australia. However, in some senses they can be described as 
strengthening this underlying protection afforded to patentees, and are some-
times characterised as ‘TRIPS plus’. The core obligations under the AUSFTA 
involve changes such as allowing extensions of pharmaceutical patent terms to 
account for regulatory delays,56 and restricting the ability of a generic competitor 
to use data relating to an originator’s patent in its own marketing approval 
applications (improving so-called regulatory data exclusivity).57 
These changes are examined in detail below and some other, perhaps unin-
tended, side effects arising from interactions between the AUSFTA provisions 
and elements of pre-existing Australian patent law are also discussed. 
1 Time Extensions 
Article 17.9.8(b) of the AUSFTA requires each country to 
make available an adjustment of the patent term to compensate the patent 
owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of 
the marketing approval process … [required for drugs].  
The pre-existing provisions in ss 70–9A of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) have been 
briefly mentioned above,58 and they seem already to satisfy the requirements of 
this provision. There has been some speculation that this provision could provide 
a basis for further protection beyond that already provided under the Patents Act 
1990 (Cth): 
Article 17.9.8 provides for the possibility of further extension of the patent 
term, including for pharmaceutical patents. This extension would be in addition 
to any extension that Australia already provides under section 70 of the Patents 
Act for pharmaceutical patents.59 
I am not convinced that this is the case. Yet, given that there is an absolute cap 
on the extension under s 77 of five years, it is arguable that if a patent term was 
curtailed for more than five years as a result of a particular marketing approval 
 
 54 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 (entered into force 1 January 2005). 
 55 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3, annex 1C (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘TRIPS’). 
 56 AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.9.8 (entered into force 1 
January 2005). 
 57 Ibid art 17.9.6. 
 58 See above n 20 and accompanying text. 
 59 Submission to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America, Parliament of Australia, 5 May 2004, Submission No 159, 18 (Peter 
Drahos, Thomas Faunce, Martyn Goddard and David Henry). 
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process then there may be some obligation to provide for a greater extension 
than the current five-year cap. However, the curtailment would still need to be 
‘unreasonable’ and the AUSFTA does not specify that the effective patent term 
must be extended to 20 years, rather, simply that there be an unspecified 
adjustment available to the patentee. 
Perhaps some indirect support for a proposition of a general term extension 
might be found in part of a US International Trade Commission report on the 
AUSFTA, which asserts that ‘the FTA goes further than TRIPS by … extending 
the terms of protection for copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets’.60 
This same report also states that: 
The FTA is expected to result in increased revenues for US industries depend-
ent on copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets. … 
Industries that might benefit from the greater patent and trade secret protec-
tions, including the protection of confidential data, are the pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemicals industries.61 
Nevertheless, the more detailed and measured analyses prepared by the rele-
vant industry consultation groups reporting to the President — the Industry 
Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy 
Matters (‘IFAC-3’) and the Industry Sector Advisory Committee for Chemicals 
and Allied Products (‘ISAC-3’) — only discuss term extension in the context of 
addressing regulatory market approval delays. Owing to their specificity and 
more relevant objectives, these analyses are to be preferred as background 
sources when trying to discern the implications of the AUSFTA. 
2 Use of Patents for Marketing Approval 
The only other provision of note is art 17.9.6, which provides that if a country 
allows a third person to use the subject matter of a patent to generate information 
necessary to support an application for marketing approval of a pharmaceutical 
product,62 then any product produced under that limited authority cannot be used 
or sold other than to meet those marketing approval requirements. 
This leads to the core of the US-advocated AUSFTA provisions, which are 
contained in the blandly designated art 17.10 (‘Measures Related to Certain 
Regulated Products’). These provisions attempt to strengthen various regulatory 
approval provisions relevant to pharmaceuticals (and agricultural chemicals) and 
to cut back on the practice of ‘springboarding’, which is said to occur when 
 
 60 US International Trade Commission, US–Australia Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-
wide and Selected Sectoral Effects (2004) 112–13 <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/ 
ftpusitcgov/ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports/studies/pub3697.pdf>. 
 61 Ibid 116. 
 62  This type of ‘pre-market’ use of the patent is commonly referred to as ‘Bolar-type’ or 
‘Roche-Bolar-type’ use. The label arises from legislative amendments (for example in the US: 
35 USC § 271(e)(1)) consequent to the case of Roche Products Inc v Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co 
Inc, 733 F 2d 858 (Fed Cir, 1984), which had produced an even more limiting construction of 
the scope of underlying exemptions to patent rights. The US commonly seeks to restrict the 
scope of Bolar-type use in the same fashion implemented here as in its other bilateral free trade 
agreements. See generally Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Agreements 
Home <http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html>. 
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generics manufacturers use test data already provided by a primary patent holder 
to gain approval for their competing drug.63 
Article 17.10.1(a) creates a five-year period of data exclusivity (in favour of 
the information provider) to previously undisclosed safety and efficacy test data 
and information, running from the date of marketing approval for that product 
(irrespective of whether it is patented). In other words, generic competitors 
cannot use that data without the data provider’s consent to market ‘the same or a 
similar product on the basis of that information’ (or without the original market 
approval).64 Article 17.10.1(c) extends similar exclusivity in relation to evidence 
about data, information and approvals submitted in other territories. 
Under art 17.10.2, if either Australia or the US requires the submission of new 
clinical information (other than in relation to bio-equivalency) as an essential 
element for the approval of a pharmaceutical product — or alternatively, requires 
evidence of prior approval in another country that also requires such information 
— then competitors are blocked for three years from marketing the same or a 
similar product on the basis of the marketing approval for the original product 
unless they have the consent of the original information provider.65 The periods 
of data exclusivity continue in this fashion even if the period of patent protection 
terminates prior to the end of the period of data exclusivity.66  ISAC-3 was 
particularly pleased with this outcome,67 though IFAC-3 was more measured in 
its assessment.68 
Article 17.10.4 is the provision described by the authors of How to Kill a 
Country: Australia’s Devastating Trade Deal with the United States as ‘the most 
egregious case of extending monopoly rights … which could be called “the 
 
 63 Note, however, that the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) has recently 
been tabled before the House of Representatives, which makes, inter alia, significant amend-
ments to the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). Schedule 7 of the Bill amends the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to 
allow springboarding as an express exception to patent infringement at any time for the sole 
purpose of obtaining regulatory approval in Australia or a foreign territory. According to the 
Explanatory Memorandum, the purpose of the exception is to bring Australia’s pharmaceutical 
patents regime closer into line with that of other jurisdictions such as the US and the European 
Union, thereby maintaining Australia’s competitiveness as an investment for generics research 
and development: Explanatory Memorandum, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 2006 
(Cth) 23. 
 64 AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.10.1(a) (entered into force 1 
January 2005). 
 65 Ibid ch 17 n 17 [26], which creates an alternative that permits parties to retain ‘a system for 
protecting information … that utilizes a previously approved chemical component from unfair 
commercial use’. 
 66 Ibid art 17.10.3. 
 67 See ISAC-3, The US–Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA): Report of the Industry Sector 
Advisory Committee for Chemicals and Allied Products (ISAC-3) (2004) 10 <http://www.ustr. 
gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file180_3402.pdf> 
which states: ‘We are particularly pleased to see that the Agreement unambiguously prevents 
Australia from arbitrarily terminating the data protection period at the time of the expiration of 
the underlying patent.’ 
 68 IFAC-3 states in its report that ‘[w]hile these provisions on data exclusivity do not impose any 
additional obligations beyond those contained in TRIPS Article 39.3, they do serve to clarify the 
intent of the negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement.’: IFAC-3, The US–Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) — The Intellectual Property Provisions: Report of the Industry Functional 
Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy Matters (IFAC-3) (2004) 
15 <http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Reports/asset_uplo 
ad_file813_3398.pdf>. 
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Evergreening Article”’.69 Even the Australian special negotiator, Stephen Deady, 
while holding a very different opinion on its impact, admitted that the specifics 
of art 17.10.4 involved ‘very tough negotiation’.70 So what does this supposedly 
heinous provision actually do? 
Article 17.10.4(a) applies to the extent that Australia permits third parties to 
seek approval for marketing a pharmaceutical product by relying on safety or 
efficacy information about a previously approved product. In such cases, 
Australia is obliged to include measures in its regulatory process — that is, the 
TGA system — to prevent the applicant from marketing a product, or a product 
for an approved use, under patent. This obligation extends to cover the entire 
term of the patent, but naturally does not apply where the patent owner has 
consented to, or acquiesced in, the use of the information. 
Further, under art 17.10.4(b), even a request from a third party for marketing 
approval for a product or a product for an approved use under patent must trigger 
a notification to the patent owner. However, if a patent for a pharmaceutical 
product has had its term extended, Australia may permit export of a product 
covered by that patent, but only for the purposes of meeting the marketing 
approval requirements of Australia or another territory. 
One possible limitation on evergreening abuses might be found in competition 
laws. This is certainly an approach being pursued or discussed overseas. 71 
Indeed, under one of the many side letters to the AUSFTA, Australia is permitted 
to allow revocation on the grounds that a patent has been determined in a judicial 
proceeding to have been used in an anti-competitive manner.72 However, the 
nexus between intellectual property and competition laws in Australia remains 
poorly developed and regulated, despite the attempts of numerous reviews and 
committees to suggest improvements.73 Nonetheless, this is likely to become a 
more significant counterbalance in the future, assuming legislative reform to the 
underlying competition framework along the lines previously recommended. 
 
 69 Linda Weiss, Elizabeth Thurbon and John Mathews, How to Kill a Country: Australia’s 
Devastating Trade Deal with the United States (2004) 131. 
 70 Evidence to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 21 June 2004, 31 (Stephen Deady). 
 71 See, eg, Christine S Paine, ‘Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations by 
Slowing Generic Production through Patent Layering’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 479; 
Decision News Media, EU Antitrust Ruling Leads to AstraZeneca Fine (16 June 2005) 
in-Pharma Technologist.com <http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/news/ng.asp?n=60702>. 
The author wishes to thank Alison Roy for this second reference. 
 72 Letter from Mark Vaile (Minister for Trade) to Robert Zoellick (United States Trade Representa-
tive), 18 May 2004, 2 <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-text/letters/17_ip_ 
patents.pdf>. 
 73 See, eg, Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual 
Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement: Final Report (2000) 13–19; 
National Competition Council, Review of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 
1974: Final Report (1999) 233–46. 
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3 Grace Periods 
One final issue to consider is a problem arising from the interplay of 
art 17.9.9 74  and the pre-existing grace period provisions 75  — a ‘potential 
anomaly’ highlighted in the recent IP Australia report, Review of Patent Grace 
Period.76 Grace periods have applied in Australia since 1 April 2002 and permit 
certain prior publications made with the authority of the patentee within 12 
months of the application date to be disregarded when assessing validity.77 The 
potentially problematic situation contemplated by the report is one where an 
applicant files a complete application which is subsequently published, and then, 
less than 12 months later, they refile a second patent in reliance upon the grace 
period. This process is termed ‘double patenting’ by the report.78  
The report observes that this type of publication should arguably be excluded 
from the grace period safe harbour, but then states that the ‘AUSFTA appears to 
prevent such an exclusion’.79 Surely this shocking ‘double-dipping’ potential, 
which on its face is more blatant and pernicious than evergreening, is not what 
was intended by the AUSFTA. An attempt to exploit art 17.9.9 would undoubt-
edly bring the patent system into disrepute, and it is hard to see even the US 
raising an AUSFTA violation complaint against any legislative or judicial moves 
to shut it down. Further, at a technical level, art 17.9.9 only discounts use of 
information in determining novelty and inventive step, but does not operate in 
relation to the threshold question of ‘manner of new manufacture’. If indeed 
there is any meaning left in that threshold test, it should be sufficient to knock 
out a double-dipping patent, which on its face is after all not new. 
In its concluding comments, the Review of Patent Grace Period report again 
refers to the AUSFTA and makes the obvious point that ‘any changes made to the 
grace period provisions would need to be considered in light of Article 17.9.9 of 
the AUSFTA’.80 No immediate change is flagged to the provisions. Rather, a 
continued programme of monitoring and influencing global developments seems 
to be contemplated, with any change delayed at least until there is further 
adoption of grace periods in the (tautologically described) ‘critical key mar-
kets’.81 If this interpretation stands, then it provides a very tangible, if limited, 
mechanism for practically achieving a further extension of protection for the 
subject matter of the base patent. It arguably represents a far more significant 
development than other more well-known changes imposed by the AUSFTA. 
 
 74 This article provides that: 
Each Party shall disregard information contained in public disclosures used to determine if an 
invention is novel or has an inventive step if the public disclosure (a) was made or authorised 
by, or derived from, the patent applicant, and (b) occurs within 12 months prior to the date of 
filing of the application in the territory of the Party. 
 75 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 24–5. 
 76 IP Australia, Review of Patent Grace Period (2005) 7 <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/ 
patents/specific/Review%20of%20the%20Patent%20Grace%20Period.pdf>. 
 77 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 24(1)(a); Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) regs 2.2(1A), 2.3(1A). 
 78 IP Australia, above n 76, 7. 
 79 Ibid. 
 80 Ibid 11. 
 81 Ibid. 
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B  US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) 
The relevant obligations imposed by the AUSFTA were implemented by the US 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth), which amended the 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth), but not the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). During 
the lead up to the 2004 election campaign, the Australian Labor Party success-
fully made a public issue out of the alleged improper use of the patent system by 
drug companies intent on delaying the entry of competing generic products (with 
consequent impacts on prices and market share) as long as possible.  
In the political skirmish that followed, a number of proposals were put for-
ward. Ultimately, the federal government agreed to include certain provisions in 
the implementing legislation designed to provide additional safeguards against 
evergreening practices. Arguably the most prominent (though not necessarily the 
most effective) of these ‘anti-evergreening’ provisions are those certificates from 
patentees wishing to enforce their rights against generics producers seeking 
marketing approval. These provisions are considered below, following an 
analysis of the potentially ‘pro-evergreening’ effect of certificates that are now 
required from persons seeking marketing approval under Therapeutic Goods Act 
1989 (Cth) s 26B. 
1 The Certification Regime 
As discussed, art 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA requires Australia to ‘provide meas-
ures in its marketing approval process to prevent’ generic producers from 
marketing a product, or a product for an approved use, if the product or use is 
covered by a patent.82 It also requires Australia to ‘provide for the patent owner 
to be notified’ of any request for marketing approval of a product or use during 
the term of the patent. This vetting of applications on patent grounds, rather than 
purely in relation to safety and efficacy, is achieved by requiring an application 
for marketing approval to make a certification under s 26B(1) either: 
(a) signifying no infringement of a valid claim;83 or 
(b) indicating that the patent holder has been notified of the intended marketing 
activities (thus enabling that party to bring infringement proceedings). 
As Christopher Arup has observed, there has been commentary as to whether this 
purely ‘procedural’ implementation of the AUSFTA obligation — which does not 
 
 82 See above Part IV(A)(2). 
 83 Note that the qualifier ‘valid’ was introduced following submissions made via the Australian 
Labor Party. Like the US system, s 26B(1)(a) provides applicants with an opportunity to  
self-assess claim validity. Naturally, these certifications are required to be made on reasonable 
grounds, and so presumably the formation of such an opinion about validity would entail profes-
sional advice to that effect. This may be well within the means of the generics drug industry but 
is a different matter for the over-the-counter and complementary healthcare sectors, whose 
particular problems with the system of certification are discussed further below: see below 
Part IV(D)(4). This ‘validity’ element parallels one aspect of the options open to generics com-
panies under the US system: a ‘paragraph IV’ certification under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 15 
USC §§ 68b–68c, 70b (1994); 21 USC §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 USC § 2201 (1994); 
35 USC §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994). 
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require any further substantive checking by the TGA — really satisfies the 
requirement to prevent patent infringement contained in art 17.10.4.84 
It is important to note that the special certificates required in relation to patent 
infringement proceedings under s 26C only apply in a situation where a certifi-
cate has been provided under s 26B(1).85 This fact may in part explain the 
approach taken in Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc,86 where 
Roche Therapeutics Inc sought an interlocutory injunction even before regula-
tory approval had been sought by the generic company, on the basis of an 
(accepted) intention to apply. This procedure would sidestep the triggering of the 
s 26B certificate and hence remove the need for any s 26C certificates, along 
with the significant potential complications and damages that may flow from 
such a certificate. 
If a s 26B(1) certificate has been given, then a patent holder wanting to sue for 
infringement must first give a certificate in accordance with s 26C(3) of the 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) that the proceedings: 
(a) are to be commenced in good faith; and 
(b) have reasonable prospects of success; and 
(c) will be conducted without unreasonable delay. 
Section 26C(4) allows ‘reasonable prospects of success’ to be deemed in a 
situation where three further sub-conditions are met by the patentee. First, the 
person must have had reasonable grounds in all the circumstances known to 
them (or which ought reasonably to have been known) for believing that he or 
she would be entitled to be granted final relief for infringement by the court. 
Second, they must also have had reasonable grounds in all the circumstances 
known to them (or which ought reasonably to have been known) for believing 
that each of the claims, in respect of which infringement is alleged, is valid. 
Third, the proceedings must not otherwise be vexatious or unreasonably pursued. 
Given that s 26C(4) does not formally and exclusively define ‘reasonable 
prospects of success’, this expression might be open to a broader construction in 
the circumstances of a particular case. The language of the section is inclusive 
and does not indicate that the conditions outlined provide the only examples of 
‘reasonable prospects of success’. 
A disincentive against improper use of certifications is provided in the form of 
s 26C(5), which imposes a penalty of up to $10 million for a certificate under 
s 26C which is false or misleading in a material particular, or if an undertaking in 
such a certificate is breached. In fixing the extent of the penalty to be imposed in 
any particular case, the court must have regard to any profit obtained by the 
provider of the certificate, and to any loss or damage suffered by any person.87 
If a person seeking marketing approval has notified a patentee of potential 
infringement by means of a s 26B(1) certificate, and the patentee or licensee 
 
 84 Christopher Arup, ‘The United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement — The Intellectual 
Property Chapter’ (2004) 15 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 205, 225. 
 85 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26C(1)(a). 
 86 (2005) 66 IPR 325. 
 87 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26C(6). 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.47.34 PM — page 46 of 33
  
46 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
     
subsequently seeks an interlocutory injunction to stop that person marketing the 
therapeutic goods on the basis of threatened patent infringement, several 
additional requirements apply. These are set out in s 26D, and include notifica-
tion of a Commonwealth or state or territory Attorney-General. 88  Further, a 
patentee or licensee in such a situation may be exposed to special damages and 
orders.89 However, these punitive provisions apply only in the very particular 
circumstances where an interlocutory injunction is granted, but the main 
proceedings are later discontinued without consent of all parties, or are dis-
missed.90 Further, before the special provisions can come into operation, the 
court must have made a specific declaration that: 
• the patentee did not have reasonable grounds to believe it would be granted 
final relief for patent infringement; 
• the patentee did not have reasonable grounds to believe it had a reasonable 
prospect of having the claims it was attempting to enforce held valid if chal-
lenged; or 
• the injunction application was ‘otherwise vexatious or not reasonably made 
or pursued’.91 
Only then is the court given the discretionary power to make the special further 
orders set out in s 26D(5). These permit awards of compensation to the applicant 
for marketing approval, either on the basis of an account of the Australian 
derived gross profits of the patentee during the period of the injunction, or on 
any other basis.92 In addition, the court may award compensation to the Com-
monwealth or state or territory, to offset increased health care costs for purchase 
of relevant drugs from the patentee (as opposed to cheaper generic alterna-
tives).93 
In the scheme of the overall system, the ‘anti-evergreening’ provisions seem a 
pyrrhic victory, useful as a media stunt but not achieving any fundamental 
reform to the system. It is hard to envision these provisions, with their multiple 
qualifications and standards, ever being effectively used against a drug company 
to impose a significant penalty, though they may result in greater internal 
scrutiny by a patentee of the merits of its case — in particular, in relation to 
which of its claims it will seek a remedy. Further, there is a serious question as to 
whether the provisions are compliant with Australia’s obligations under TRIPS 
and the AUSFTA to provide patent rights without discrimination. Article 27(1) of 
TRIPS provides in relation to patentable subject matter that: ‘patents shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to … the field of 
 
 88 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26D(2). The Commonwealth Attorney-General is then 
deemed to be a party to the proceedings unless he or she gives written notice opting out: 
s 26D(3). 
 89 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26D(4)–(5). 
 90 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26D(4)(a)–(b). 
 91 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26D(4)(c). 
 92 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26D(5)(a). 
 93 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26D(5)(b)–(c). 
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technology’. 94  Arguably these provisions, in mounting additional hurdles for 
patentees seeking to enforce their rights over pharmaceutical inventions, do 
discriminate in relation to the enjoyment of patent rights.95 
C  US Views  
The US did not appreciate the introduction of the Australian Labor 
Party-sponsored changes, imposing special requirements and burdens on 
pharmaceutical companies seeking to enforce their patent rights. Indeed, the 
United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick referred to them with 
disapproval in his exchange of letters with Minister for Trade, Mark Vaile, on the 
implementation of the AUSFTA in Australian legislation, and expressly reserved 
US rights: 
If Australia’s law is not sufficient to prevent the marketing of a product, or a 
product for an approved use, where the product or use is covered by a patent, 
Australia will have acted inconsistently with the Agreement. We will be moni-
toring this matter closely, and reserve all rights and remedies as discussed be-
low. 
We also remain concerned about recent amendments to sections 26B(1)(a), 26C 
and 26D of the Therapeutic Goods Act of 1989. Under these amendments, 
pharmaceutical patent owners risk incurring significant penalties when they 
seek to enforce their patent rights. These provisions impose a potentially sig-
nificant, unjustifiable, and discriminatory burden on the enjoyment of patent 
rights, specifically on owners of pharmaceutical patents. I urge the Australian 
Government to review this matter, particularly in the light of Australia’s inter-
national legal obligations. The United States reserves its rights to challenge the 
consistency of these amendments with such obligations.96 
In the concluding paragraphs of his letter, Zoellick stated: 
bringing the Agreement into effect is without prejudice to any future action the 
US Government may take regarding compliance of Australia’s laws and other 
measures with the Agreement … If subsequent practice reveals problems with 
the full exercise of US rights I have discussed above, Australia should expect 
that we will take appropriate remedial action.97 
Zoellick has indicated that if a problem did emerge in the practical operation of 
these ‘anti-evergreening’ provisions, the US would first attempt bilateral 
resolution with Australia, but failing that would litigate the matter before the 
WTO. 98  Both the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
Associations and the US Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Associa-
 
 94 TRIPS, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3, annex 1C, art 27(1) (entered into 
force 1 January 1995) (emphasis added). 
 95 The obligation is subject to various other provisions, but these are all directed to issues of 
exclusion from patentable subject matter rather than enjoyment of the rights: see ibid arts 27(3), 
65(4), 70(8). 
 96 Letter from Robert Zoellick to Mark Vaile, 17 November 2004, 3 <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/ 
negotiations/us_fta/final-text/letters/ip_zoellick_vaile.pdf>. 
 97 Ibid 4. 
 98 Lush Media, US Still Watchful on FTA (22 November 2004) Pharma in Focus <http://www. 
pharmainfocus.com.au/news.asp?newsid=517>. 
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tion have reportedly commented that they view these provisions as being 
inconsistent with Australia’s obligations under TRIPS.99 
By contrast, the core body that advises the President on the acceptability of the 
intellectual property related aspects of free trade agreements, IFAC-3, reported 
very favourably on the ‘TRIPS plus’ provisions of the AUSFTA, and with an 
isolated exception,100 recommended that they form a new model for future free 
trade negotiations with other countries.101 IFAC-3 contains a high proportion of 
originator pharmaceutical company representatives,102 and others have written 
elsewhere of the key role of pharmaceutical companies and executives in 
promoting the cause of intellectual property protection on a global basis, 
including in the genesis of TRIPS.103 However, these groups are also represented 
in the elaborate internal structures of US free trade negotiations by another 
collective, ISAC-3, which made similar comments to IFAC-3.104  
D  Australian Views 
What of Australian views? This article now considers the comments from the 
Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America (‘Senate Committee’),105 parliamentary researchers, 
academics, practitioners and local industry groups. 
1 Senate Committee 
The Senate Committee expressed concern at the prospect of escalating drug 
costs caused by the changes that further delay the entry of generics into the 
marketplace. 106  Two possible problems were identified. First, that imposing 
further restrictions on generic producers might provide new methods for patent 
holders to block their entry using litigation. Second, the concern that extending 
greater data exclusivity to a patentee over test data would in practice delay 
regulatory approval for generic products. 
 
 99 Lush Media, International Pharma Crits FTA (25 October 2004) Pharma in Focus <http://www. 
pharmainfocus.com.au/news.asp?newsid=469>. 
100 See IFAC-3, above n 68, 15: 
IFAC-3 is, however, troubled, by the recognition, in paragraph 1 of Side Letter 2, of Austra-
lia’s current practice to permit the export by a third party of a pharmaceutical product covered 
by a patent during the period of patent term extension permitted under Article 17.10.4 for pur-
poses of meeting the marketing approval requirements of another territory as well as of Aus-
tralia. IFAC-3 believes that there should not be any differentiation between the protections 
provided pharmaceutical patents during the initial patent term or during the extension, as is the 
current practice in the United States. 
101 Ibid: ‘IFAC-3 welcomes these provisions with respect to certain regulated products contained in 
AFTA and urges that they be retained in all future FTAs.’ 
102 At the time of publication of the report, members of IFAC-3 included: Dr Joseph A Imler, 
Director, Public Policy, Merck & Company Inc; Susan K Finston, Associate Vice-President for 
IP and Middle East/Africa Affairs, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America; 
Catherine P Bennett, Vice-President, Federal Tax and Trade Legislation, Pfizer Inc.  
103 See, eg, Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? (2002) 147–8, 160–1. 
104 ISAC-3, above n 67. 
105 See Senate Committee, Parliament of Australia, Final Report (2004). 
106 Ibid [4.64]–[4.65]. 
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The Senate Committee did find that the AUSFTA may not have gone as far 
down the ‘pro-pharmaceutical’ industry road as US negotiators originally 
intended.107 It also commented favourably on the good intentions behind the 
implementing legislation. 108  Nevertheless, it expressed misgivings about the 
uncertainty and potential adverse impact of the new requirements and adminis-
trative procedures for generic manufacturers. 
An uncontroversial conclusion was reached: ‘Any delay to the marketing of 
generic drugs as a consequence of these changes, however slight, will have a cost 
to the PBS, state governments and consumers.’109 It also expressed concern that 
there were no future plans to monitor actively the impact of these changes.110 
Earlier, the government’s special negotiator to the AUSFTA accepted that 
delaying generic market entry could increase cost, but was at great pains to stress 
that (in his opinion) nothing agreed to in the AUSFTA would lead to such an 
outcome. The negotiator made numerous commitments to that effect and 
appeared insulted at the suggestion that there could be any substantive effect on 
delay as a consequence of the AUSFTA.111 
2 Parliamentary Researchers 
The Senate Committee cited a paper by parliamentary researchers, Dr Kate 
Burton and Jacob Varghese, on this point, which identifies several possible 
complications for determining patent infringement, given the potential issues 
associated with a claim’s validity and the prospect of multiple patents covering 
different uses. 112  After briefly mentioning those complications, the paper 
discusses the tactical options that generic manufacturers have under the certifica-
tion scheme before springboarding: 
Taking [the] first option [certifying non-infringement] would risk a fine if the 
certification is later found to be false or misleading. However, it might be a 
safe option where the patent has clearly expired, or where other generics are on 
the market already. 
Where the issue is particularly complex, the last two may be the only options. 
The second option [applying for a court declaration to settle uncertainty before 
certifying] involves the commencement of litigation. The third option [notify-
ing the patent holder of the application and certifying accordingly] allows the 
patent holder to consider litigation. In either case, litigation of these matters 
would be happening before rather than after the generic has entered the market. 
Currently, generic manufactures have much more control over when any litiga-
tion takes place, with the option to enter the market first.113 
 
107 Ibid [4.73]. 
108 Ibid [4.88], [4.102]. 
109 Ibid [4.102] (emphasis in original). 
110 Ibid [4.103]. 
111 See, eg, Evidence to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia 
and the United States of America, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 21 June 2004, 48, 58, 63–4 
(Stephen Deady). 
112 See Senate Committee, above n 105, [4.97], citing Kate Burton and Jacob Varghese, ‘The PBS 
and the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement’ (Research Note No 3, Parliamentary Library, 
Parliament of Australia, 2004). 
113 Burton and Varghese, above n 112, 3. 
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Burton and Varghese acknowledge that the new provisions have adverse con-
sequences for generic manufacturers and exert some dissuasive or delaying 
effect,114 but are unclear as to whether it would make a significant practical 
difference or just present a fairly small technical change to an already complex 
regulatory system. Commenting on the AUSFTA changes prior to the adoption of 
the Australian Labor Party-inspired ‘anti-evergreening’ amendments, they also 
observe that the new processes might encourage evergreening. In particular, they 
commented on the complications posed by ‘new use’ patents, where generics 
might be sold for some applications but not others, making the determination of 
infringement quite difficult and further deterring generics competitors, poten-
tially even from competing against the ‘old use’ market.115 
3 Practitioners and Academics 
Peter Drahos, when asked whether the changes proposed by the Australian 
Labor Party would prevent evergreening, commented that they would not, 
because evergreening takes place in the Patent Office … [s]o companies [will 
continue to] apply for patents on drugs in the Patent Office, in order to try and 
increase the web of patents they have around a particular compound, and that 
web of patents [will continue to act] as a deterrent.116 
Drahos went on to observe that these amendments do not address the initial 
build-up of patent rights at all, but rather may deter the use of those patents in 
litigation.  
Andrew Christie and Sally Pryor observed that an attempt to target so-called 
‘dodgy’ patent claims was good in theory but ‘impossible in practice’.117 While 
acknowledging the potential for the blight of evergreening to spread further in 
Australia, they felt that the changes being introduced avoided the worst elements 
of implementation of similar requirements in the US, despite imposing some 
extra burdens on generic manufacturers. As they further commented:  
The trouble is that dodgy is not a ground for examination under patent law. It is 
a subjective term, and one that exists only in the eye of the beholder, so to 
speak … An evergreen patent may well pass the standard of innovation, even 
though it contributes little or nothing to social welfare. So long as there is an 
invention, the law is blind to the purpose for which it is being patented, and so-
cial and economic issues don’t get a look-in.118 
Innes anticipated little change in the ability to evergreen in Australia as a result 
of implementing the AUSFTA and displayed more faith than Drahos in the ability 
of the existing patent examination, opposition and revocation systems to stifle 




116 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Home Detention’, The Law Report, 10 August 2004 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/lawrpt/stories/s1267686.htm>. 
117 Andrew Christie and Sally Pryor, Evergreen Dilemma: Law Blind to Patent’s Purpose (17 
August 2004) On Line Opinion <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2457>. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Innes, above n 31, 7. 
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possible consequences for the frequency with which pharmaceutical patents are 
litigated.120 
Are there any practical changes to the use of the patent system that are likely 
to arise in reaction to the AUSFTA? As observed above, it may be that advisers 
will increase the level of scrutiny of claims upon which reliance will be placed in 
litigation, but it is unlikely that the Australian Labor Party-sponsored ‘safe-
guards’ will have any significant effect on the ability of companies to gain patent 
rights. Indeed, the overall impact of the changes may be a more extensive use of 
particular elements of the patent system. Richard Hamer and Tom Reid have 
advised innovators to ensure that any secondary or formulation patents are 
granted prior to the expiry of the original or base patent, or alternatively — if 
there is some delay in obtaining a standard patent — to file a divisional innova-
tion patent so that they will be able to benefit from the immediate grant of such 
innovation patents.121 This feature has been available since the introduction of 
the innovation patent system, but the AUSFTA changes now extend the advan-
tages of such an approach by enabling patents to be obtained immediately, thus 
triggering further complications for a generics competitor. 
4 Industry Groups 
How has the Australian pharmaceutical industry reacted to these changes? The 
chair of the Generic Medicines Industry Association122 was reportedly satisfied 
that the AUSFTA would not encourage evergreening, but remained alert to the 
possible expansion of evergreening practices: 
The Government has repeatedly assured us there will be no delay to the market 
entry of generic medicines and we believe that the legislation is consistent with 
this … [h]owever, irrespective of the FTA, spurious patent claims, or ‘ever-
greening’, is a growing trend outside of Australia, which we must ensure does 
not occur here.123  
However there were reports in early 2005 that the AUSFTA was having unin-
tended and nasty side effects on the over-the-counter and complementary 
medicine industries and those industry groups were much less sanguine than the 
Generic Medicines Industry Association.124 Concerns were raised with Parlia-
mentary Secretary to the Minister for Health and Ageing, Christopher Pyne, by 
the Complementary Healthcare Council and others. It was asserted that there was 
a considerable new compliance burden as a result of the certification require-
ments, which have been imposed not simply on the generics industry but also the 
on complementary medicines sector, the latter not having troubled itself much in 
 
120 Ibid. 
121 Richard Hamer and Tom Reid, ‘FTA Impact on Pharmaceuticals’ (April 2004) Allens Arthur 
Robinson: Focus 2 <http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/pdf/ip/foftaapr04.pdf>. 
122 John Montgomery, Chief Executive Officer of Alphapharm Pty Ltd (‘Alphapharm’), holds the 
position. Note that Alphapharm is part of the Merck KGaA group of companies which special-
ises in pharmaceuticals and chemicals. 
123 David Wroe, ‘Drug Groups Cool on Labor Safeguards’, The Age (Melbourne), 4 August 2004, 4, 
quoting John Montgomery. 
124 See, eg, Lush Media, FTA Compliance Costing Millions, Industry Calls for a Rethink (21 March 
2005) Pharma in Focus <http://www.pharmainfocus.com.au/news.asp?newsid=646>. 
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relation to patent matters in the past. Original estimates of cost increases for each 
application (as a result of legal and patent checks) were of the order of $8000, 
with an industry-wide cost increase of $16 million. Secondary costs were 
estimated to cost downstream consumers some $64–80 million. Apparently there 
was also an early implementation problem: the TGA was alleged not to have 
notified the industry of the certification requirement until mid-February, but the 
automatic lodgement system had apparently continued to accept uncertified 
applications until that point. Companies had relied on those acceptances in 
taking their products to market, creating a regulatory ‘no man’s land’ that the 
TGA was insisting be rectified by retrospective provision of certificates. 
More recent contact with the Complementary Healthcare Council indicates 
that the changes are still causing considerable problems within this sector, with 
an estimated cost increase of $5000 per application.125 Given the difficulty of 
searching the patent databases and the literature more generally, and the consid-
erable resources required to challenge validity, reportedly ‘most companies 
would rather just shy away from the product opportunity’.126 
The Therapeutic Goods Amendment Bill [No 2] 2005 (Cth) was introduced on 
14 September 2005 to try to address some of these concerns. It refers to the 
existing two-tiered approach to pharmaceutical regulation of drugs, which 
discriminates between registered and listed medicines. The latter category, which 
comprises most complementary medicines and some over-the-counter products 
(such as sunscreens), is viewed as low risk and does not require submission of 
safety or efficacy data. The proposed amendments to the Therapeutic Goods Act 
1989 (Cth) would mean that the patent certification requirements under s 26B(1) 
would only apply to someone seeking to rely on safety or efficacy data previ-
ously submitted to the TGA. For those people simply applying for the listing of 
therapeutic goods such as complementary medicines, there would still be a 
requirement to provide a notice stating that the patent certification requirements 
did not apply.127 
V  RECENT AUSTRALIAN EVERGREENING CASES 
One of the most recent cases dealing with evergreening in Australia is Ar-
row v Merck.128 In this decision, Gyles J comprehensively found in favour of 
Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd (‘Arrow’) and revoked Merck & Co Inc’s (‘Merck’) 
patent, which involved the use of alendronate to treat osteoporosis in a way that 
minimised the potential for adverse gastrointestinal effects. The outcome is 
apparent in the first few sentences: ‘The case involves what would now collo-
quially be called an attempt to “evergreen” a pharmaceutical patent. I find that 
the application for revocation succeeds.’129 
 
125 Email from Anna Day (Communications and Media Manager, Complementary Healthcare 
Council) to Robert Chalmers, 8 September 2005. 
126 Email from Attila Pataki (Product Development Manager — Technical, Blackmores Ltd) to 
Robert Chalmers, 14 September 2005. 
127 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 26(1)(aa)(ii). 
128 (2004) 63 IPR 85. 
129 Ibid 87 (Gyles J). 
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The original or base patent, which had no Australian equivalent, claimed 
priority back to 1982. Essentially, it disclosed alendronic acid, compositions of 
this acid and a method of inhibiting bone resorption by administering it in a 
particular manner. The patent was formulated slightly differently in each 
jurisdiction. It had been attacked and revoked in the UK but upheld in the US.130 
The relevant Australian patent claimed priority to 1989 and was directed to a 
specific alendronate monosodium trihydrate species, compositions containing it, 
and a process for preparing the acid or salts and methods for treating or prevent-
ing osteoporosis by administering these agents.131 Merck sold a treatment under 
the brand name ‘Fosamax’, but then developed an alternative dosing regime, 
addressed in part to improving gastrointestinal side effects but also patient 
compliance with dosing and other marketing attractions. Gyles J’s judgment 
contains an extensive discussion of the drug development process inside Merck, 
and the prominent influence of non-therapeutic issues in decision-making.132 A 
paper prepared for a Merck technical review meeting in 1997 stated that: 
Since much of the drive to develop these new approaches is based upon Mar-
keting needs, the Marketing group will briefly present their perspectives on the 
potential value of the alternative formulations, tablet image and the needs for 
increased dosing flexibility.133 
Of particular interest is a diagram and table entitled ‘FOSAMAX Development 
Activities’ prepared for Merck’s Tactical Product Approval Committee.134 This 
diagram illustrates, along a timeline, the key data findings, competitive product 
launches, possible filing dates for new use claims, and the expiry of the original 
use patent. 
Gyles J described this internal Merck document at length and highlights some 
of the entries that suggest the filing was more concerned with the market and 
market protection issues than a genuine innovation directed at improved thera-
pies. Indeed, in some of the later comments in the report for the Tactical Product 
Approval Committee in relation to Alternative Dosing Regimes, it seems that the 
supposed aim of addressing gastrointestinal side effects was more a rationale 
than a reality:  
To overcome the perception of rigorous dosing and administration schedules, in 
addition to alternative formulations, alternative dosing of the tablet form 
should be considered. Once weekly oral dosing with the same total weekly 
dose could be offered as an alternative to daily dosing. This would probably 
have greater patient acceptance and is unlikely to have a greater potential to 
induce upper gastrointestinal irritation. 
Also, it may be possible to patent the weekly regimen, potentially with specific 
reference to the 35 and 70 mg doses. A patent would be more achievable if a 
rationale for considering possible improved safety could be put together based 
upon the dog esophageal model safety assessment testing. … Human studies 
 
130  Ibid 90 (Gyles J). 
131 Ibid 91 (Gyles J). 
132 Ibid 93–111. 
133 Ibid 101 (Gyles J) (emphasis in original). 
134 See ibid 102. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.47.34 PM — page 54 of 33
  
54 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
     
could show that alendronate daily or weekly are equally safe dosing regimens, 
but since esophageal adverse experiences are rare, it would require very large 
numbers to prove that weekly dosing is superior. If weekly dosing is patentable, 
this regimen would allow for extension of the FOSAMAX patent to 2018.135  
Excerpts from later emails include the following: 
We are looking carefully (and quickly) at the patentability of weekly dosing. 
There are several intermittant [sic] regimens for bisphosphonates that have 
been included in patents, but Anastasia and I believe that we have at least some 
chance to get exclusive patent rights to use bisphosphonates weekly to lower 
the potential for esophageal ulceration (as well as enhance convenience) …  
Marketing have expressed a strong interest in having a 35 or 70 mg tablet for 
once-a-week administration. It is believed that this approach may further real-
ize a patent advantage.136 
This documentation obviously had significance for Gyles J. His Honour later 
observed that ‘[t]he possibility of patent protection extending beyond the life of 
the existing patents was a most desirable side effect of the exercise and encour-
aged Merck to devote resources to the project’.137 
Apart from the rather interesting internal documentation, Merck faced a sub-
stantial problem in the form of prior publication in Lunar News articles of April 
1996, July 1996 and April 1997 about less frequent dosing of greater amounts of 
alendronate.138 Notwithstanding the very limited circulation of these articles in 
Australia before the priority date, the prior publication of information regarding 
alternative dosing options was sufficient to pose difficulties for Merck in 
relation to novelty, as discussed further below.139 
However, Gyles J’s primary attack on the patents related to the basic lack of 
patentable subject matter. First, his Honour dispensed fairly ruthlessly with the 
four claims expressed in the form of composition claims: ‘It is tolerably plain on 
the face of the patent that the so-called composition claims lack subject mat-
ter.’140 His Honour pointed to standard formulation techniques and a complete 
lack of specific adaptation to a weekly regimen as opposed to some other dosing 
system, concluding that: 
These are not composition claims as that concept would normally be under-
stood, that is, claims to a new and unique compound. They are not combination 
claims whereby the whole is something different from the sum of the parts. 
When properly analysed the composition claims are devoid of practical content. 
They are not ‘inventions’ and are not a manner of manufacture.141 
 
135 Ibid 103–4 (emphasis in original). 
136 Ibid 106–8 (emphasis in original), citing: Email from John A Yates to Elizabeth Stoner and 
Edward M Scolnick, 9 June 1997; Email from Askok V Katdare to Michelle W Kloss et al, 13 
June 1997. 
137 Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 113. 
138 Ibid 95, 96, 100 (Gyles J). 
139 See below nn 158–9 and accompanying text. 
140 Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 114. 
141 Ibid. 
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In relation to the remaining method claims, his Honour observed that they each 
‘relate[d] to the use of a known substance with known properties for a known 
purpose in a known manner.’142 Gyles J could discern no new process, method of 
administration or disclosure of any new compound properties. After discussing 
relevant authorities further, his Honour concluded on an interim basis: 
each of the so-called method claims was one way of utilising alendronate and 
its known qualities for the known purpose of preventing or treating osteoporo-
sis by a known method of oral administration. They are in the nature of direc-
tions for use. That does not constitute an invention or a manner of manufac-
ture.143 
Gyles J went on to discuss the practical and commercial impact of situations 
such as the present case, where a pharmaceutical company has base patent rights 
around chemical compositions and therapeutic applications, which may then 
operate to stop or hinder any clinical trials which are required as part of the 
regulatory process but are not authorised by the patent owner. As Gyles J 
commented, 
[t]he regulatory regime is such that clinical trials are essential before there can 
be commercial exploitation. The opportunity for refining and improving the 
application of the base patent is, in a practical sense, limited to the patentee or 
those authorised by it. Once Merck obtained the base patent, it could control 
that field. As it controls use of the compound, it acquires the most widespread 
knowledge of the application of the compound. The patentee will thus have a 
virtual monopoly of the commercial development of it. … a practical monopoly 
of the opportunity of further refining the use of that invention.144 
As a sidenote, putting to one side the commercial issues, this type of situation 
raises the question of the existence of, or need for, a research exemption in 
relation to patent infringement. The Advisory Council on Intellectual Property’s 
Patents and Experimental Use: Options Paper concluded that there ‘appears to 
be no strong empirical evidence in Australia of any form of patent “thicket” 
affecting cumulative innovation’, but did acknowledge the risk that it could 
evolve.145 It is interesting to note the position of Medicines Australia, in its 
response to the Options Paper, where it stated: ‘that experimental use should be 
encompassed within the exclusive rights of the patent owner still remains as our 
overall preferred position’.146 As a result, the scope of any defence in relation to 
research use, whether legislated or introduced by case law,147 is of considerable 
 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid 115. 
144 Ibid 115–16. 
145 Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, Patents and Experimental Use: Options Paper (2004) 
38 <http://www.acip.gov.au/library/Experimental%20Use%20Options%20Paper%20A.pdf>. 
146 Submission to Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, Consideration of Patents and 
Experimental Use, 14 March 2005, Submission No 13, 1 (Medicines Australia) 
<http://www.acip.gov.au/expuseoptsubs/Medicines%20Australia.pdf>. The submission briefly 
continued, ‘however, given ACIP’s desire for respondents to stay within the options proposed 
our members [sic] position would be to favour option B — No Change.’: at 1. 
147 Cf the US position in Merck KGaA v Integra LifeSciences I Ltd, 125 S Ct 2372 (2005). In this 
case, the US Supreme Court effectively broadened the ‘safe harbour’ use of patented inventions 
 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.47.34 PM — page 56 of 33
  
56 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
     
significance. If Parliament does make statutory changes, the scope of any such 
exception is unclear, especially in relation to whether it would permit clinical 
trials as equivalent laws in a few other territories do.148 
Following his Honour’s comments about the negative impacts upon down-
stream innovation, Gyles J struggled with the notion that the base patent life 
could effectively be extended through simple refinement of previous instructions 
for use — a new ‘best method’ of practice:  
There is something anomalous about a patent being obtained for all pharmaceu-
tical uses of a chemical compound without disclosing any particular dosage re-
gime for any particular use but with the patentee later claiming a new, 
stand-alone, patent for a particular dosage regime for a particular purpose that 
was contemplated at the time of the base patent, with no new properties of the 
compound having been discovered in an inventive fashion in the meantime.149 
Perhaps a comparison may be drawn with certain selection patents over com-
pound claims, where an initial patent claims a whole class of compounds and a 
subsequent patent claims a particular compound within that class. In any event, 
Gyles J’s obvious distaste for evergreening situations is apparent in his Honour’s 
brief discussion of the potential application of Patents Act 1990 (Cth) Chapter 7, 
dealing with patents of addition: 
the legislature obviously intended that, even if what is proposed is a true im-
provement in or modification of the main invention, and not merely instruc-
tions as to use of it, a consequent patent of addition should not extend beyond 
the life of the base patent.150 
Under Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 81(1), if there has been an application for, or a 
grant of, protection on one patent (‘the main invention’), and the patentee, 
applicant or an authorised person applies for a further patent for an improvement 
or modification of the main patent, the Commissioner may grant a patent of 
addition for that improvement or modification. A critical factor is that, failing an 
extension of term under the provisions of Chapter 6 Part 6151 the term of a patent 
of addition is generally only coincident with the term of the patent for the main 
invention.152 However, s 81(1)(c) requires that an application for the further 
patent be ‘made in accordance with the regulations’. It is conceivable that this 
might be read generally to require that an application be made in accordance 
with the regulations applicable to any patent, but the Australian Patent Office’s 
Manual of Practice and Procedure indicates that the application must specify 
 
for any reasonable purpose connected to the generation of data for submission for regulatory 
approval, including but not limited to clinical trials. 
148 In particular Germany and Japan: see, eg, Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, 
above n 145, 40–1. 
149 Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 116. 
150 Ibid (citations omitted). 
151 Note that under these provisions, the patent of addition may be extended independently of the 
patent for the main invention: Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 83(2). 
152 See Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 116 (Gyles J) commenting that ‘[e]ven if it could qualify 
as a patent of addition pursuant to Ch 7 of the Act it would have been limited to the term of the 
salt patent.’ 
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that it is for a patent of addition.153 It is hard to envisage that a pharmaceutical 
company attempting evergreening-type tactics would want to characterise a 
patent designed to effectively extend the protection given to a family of related 
innovations as a patent of addition, since even a successful application would not 
extend the term of protection for it or the main invention. However, because of 
the apparent requirement that an applicant actually ask for a patent of addition, 
Chapter 7 does not provide a mechanism for the Commissioner to characterise a 
subsequent application as being for a patent of addition at their initiative and 
discretion. 
Gyles J then spent some time grappling with the decision of the Full Federal 
Court in Faulding.154 At one point, his Honour conceded that ‘[i]t does seem to 
follow that it was held that a mere dosage regime of a known chemical com-
pound for a known therapeutic use based upon known properties and involving 
no new method of administration was patentable’. 155  His Honour expressed 
obvious dissatisfaction with this position, preferring the approach taken by the 
English Court of Appeal in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharma-
ceuticals Inc.156 Ultimately, however, Gyles J distinguished Faulding on its facts, 
finding that in the present case there was no new technical effect or utility.157 
Obviously mindful of the potential susceptibility of revocation based purely on 
arguments related to manner of manufacture, Gyles J went on to demolish the 
Merck patent on novelty grounds as well. His Honour first found that the Lunar 
News publications (which included a website reference as well as physical copies 
of the publication) had anticipated a number of the claims, but not all of them.158 
A number of the other claims were found to have been anticipated by Merck’s 
own marketing activities predating the priority date. 159  However, Gyles J 
rejected attacks by Arrow on the grounds of entitlement (it had been alleged that 
a true inventor had not been included),160 false suggestion,161 and fair basis.162 
Finally, Gyles J dealt only partly with issues in relation to inventive step, 
though his Honour had already made his views apparent in his discussion about 
manner of manufacture, finding a complete lack of patentable subject matter.163 
Gyles J expressly rejected inventive step in relation to the so-called composition 
claims. In relation to the method claims, his Honour observed that ‘[i]ngenuity 
might be exercised, but not invention.’164 
 
153 See Australian Patent Office, above n 22, [18.1.3]. 
154 (2000) 97 FCR 524. See Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 116–20. 
155 Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 119. 
156 [2001] RPC 1. See ibid 119–20. 
157 Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 120. 
158 Ibid 123. 
159 Ibid 124 (Gyles J). 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. See also Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 138(3)(d), which prescribes a two-limbed test: one arm 
linked to the entitlement argument and one arm linked to an allegation of false representation of 
some prior art. 
162 Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 125. 
163 Ibid 114–20. 
164 Ibid 125. 
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In conclusion, on the various grounds discussed above, all the claims that 
Arrow had attacked were indeed invalid. On the basis of the material set out in 
the judgment — in particular the extensive use of internal Merck documentation 
related to the process and motivations for patent filing165 — it is hard not to feel 
strong sympathy toward Gyles J’s findings on manner of new manufacture, 
inventiveness and novelty, even if the first two in particular may be open to 
question on appeal. 
It is interesting also to compare this outcome to the UK decision in Merck & 
Co Inc’s Patents, 166  which also related to alendronate. Although the case 
ultimately turned on differing UK laws relating to methods of medical treatment, 
the court found that the second patent lacked novelty and was obvious in the 
light of the prior art. Merck’s appeal against Jacob J’s decision in that case was 
unsuccessful.167 
The decision in Arrow v Merck has since been appealed and was heard before 
Heerey, Dowsett and Hely JJ in May 2005, and again before Heerey, Dowsett 
and Kiefel JJ in December 2005. The outcome of that appeal is awaited with 
interest.168 Earlier in Merck & Co Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd,169 Heerey J 
ruled on a procedural matter connected to Arrow’s attempt to uphold the original 
findings on grounds of inventive step in relation to which Gyles J had not made 
findings of primary fact.170 Heerey J decided that the issue should not be argued 
at the appellate level as it would be unfair to Merck and would not enable 
efficient processing of the appeal by the Full Federal Court.171 
In contrast, consider the earlier office-level decision in relation to an opposi-
tion brought by Lek Pharmaceutical against Smithkline Beecham. 172  The 
Delegate of the Commissioner held that, despite problems in relation to novelty, 
inventive step and fair basis in relation to a few claims, the majority of the 
application was acceptable.173 The invention related to a new ratio for a common 
antibiotic composition for paediatric use — interestingly, again with the aim of 
reducing the problem of gastric irritancy. 
Even more recently in Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc,174 
Roche Therapeutics Inc tried to obtain interlocutory relief in respect of alleged 
infringement of its ‘beta-blocker’ Australian patent, entitled ‘Use of Carbazole 
 
165 See above nn 134–5 and accompanying text. 
166 [2003] FSR 29 (‘Merck & Co Inc’s Patents First Instance’). 
167 Merck & Co Inc’s Patents [2004] FSR 16 (‘Merck & Co Inc’s Patents Appeal’). See also the 
decision in relation to related regulatory approval matters in R (On the Application of Merck 
Sharp & Dohme Ltd) v Licensing Authority [2005] EWHC 710 (Admin) (Unreported, Moses J, 
28 April 2005). 
168 At the time of writing, judgment in the appeal was still pending. Note also that cost orders were 
made in Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Merck & Co Inc [2005] FCA 188 (Unreported, Gyles J, 9 
March 2005). 
169 [2005] FCA 425 (Unreported, Heerey J, 13 April 2005). 
170 Arrow v Merck (2004) 63 IPR 85, 125. 
171 Merck & Co Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2005] FCA 425 (Unreported, Heerey J, 13 April 
2005) [3]. 
172 Smithkline Beecham plc v Lek Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co DD (2004) 61 IPR 626. 
173 Ibid 644 (Delegate Jenkins). 
174 (2005) 66 IPR 325. 
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Compounds for the Treatment of Congestive Heart Failure’.175 In this case, no 
actual application for market approval had been granted — the application was 
made on the basis of intention only. Hexal Australia Pty Ltd (‘Hexal’) and 
Alphapharm contended validity (novelty and inventiveness), infringement and 
fair basis. Stone J decided there were serious issues to be tried on both infringe-
ment and invalidity, with a preliminary leaning towards invalidity.176 Ultimately 
Stone J refused the application for interlocutory relief on the balance of conven-
ience, deciding damages could be clearly quantified and were an adequate 
remedy.177 Interestingly — though it was not a point discussed much in the 
judgment — in relation to the issue of balance of convenience, counsel for Hexal 
and Alphapharm argued that the public interest (in having access to cheaper 
medicines and against the assertion of invalid patent rights) was a relevant 
consideration.178 
VI  CONCLUSION 
In the field of pharmaceuticals there is obviously a large financial incentive for 
originator drug companies to push the boundaries of protection systems. For 
these companies, a patent is another business tool to be exploited as part of their 
duty to maximise shareholder returns. Whether through innovation in technol-
ogy, innovation in the use of legal mechanisms, or both, we can expect to see the 
originator sector179 working hard to expand protection of its intellectual property 
assets in the most effective way it can. Efforts to ‘evergreen’, ‘bootstrap’ and 
‘double up’ patent portfolios — which might alternatively be viewed simply as 
an astute use of legal rules — will continue. 
These are not fundamentally new problems but some of the changes intro-
duced by the AUSFTA further promote extended protection. Most of the obvious 
changes are those that expand the protection offered by peripheral mechanisms 
— through regulatory data exclusivity and tightened controls over marketing 
approval for generics companies — rather than making any fundamental changes 
to patent law. It is interesting to observe another example of indirect measures 
being used to support intellectual property protection, here in the form of the 
‘patent-friendly’ certification required of those seeking marketing approval for 
drugs. 180  There is an implicit presumption of infringement pending (self-) 
declaration of innocence — a declaration that is made under threat of penalties if 
improper. Further, it seems that these provisions have had some adverse side 
effects for the over-the-counter and complementary medicine sectors of the 
broader drug industry, raising compliance costs for little net benefit. The 
 
175 Ibid 326 (Stone J). 
176 Ibid 330–7, 340. 
177 Ibid 340. 
178 Ibid 338, 340 (Stone J). 
179 See IFAC-3, above n 68, which was discussed above as the ‘pioneer’ part of the sector, 
connoting in part visions of pioneers of a bygone age forging a new life in their trek across the 
American landscape. 
180 Cf AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, ch 17 (entered into force 1 
January 2005), describing the additional protection for technical protection measures and elec-
tronic rights management information in a copyright context. 
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government’s new and improved formulation, to be implemented by the Thera-
peutic Goods Amendment Bill [No 2] 2005 (Cth), should diminish this side 
effect, but of course it implicitly acknowledges the unintended breadth of the 
original provisions. 
Perhaps the most significant direct impact will come from the side effects of 
the interaction between AUSFTA art 17.9.9 and the grace period provisions, if 
indeed that bizarre loophole is not dismissed or shut down — as it should be — 
but is instead successfully exploited. It is unlikely that the ‘anti-evergreening’ 
changes will rein in patent prosecutions; at face value, they simply strengthen the 
ability of pharmaceutical companies to enforce patents. If, however, these 
provisions do emerge as constraining patent enforcement, then the US is likely to 
challenge them. As discussed above, these provisions may already be in breach 
of the AUSFTA and TRIPS by introducing discrimination as to enjoyment of 
rights in a particular technological field. Indeed, there were reports earlier this 
year that the federal government was considering abandoning the 
‘anti-evergreening’ amendments in response to heavy lobbying by the US 
pharmaceutical industry and the US Trade Representative.181 A formal review of 
the AUSFTA was imminent at the time of writing. 
Ultimately, the core checks and balances on evergreening practices are those 
provided by IP Australia and the courts. However, this oversight can only be 
brought to bear upon matters taken before those institutions, and of course many 
issues will not make it that far. The disparity in resources and expertise between 
IP Australia and private patent attorneys funded by the pharmaceutical industry 
is obvious, and the potential implications of the lack of resources at the assess-
ment stage have been mentioned elsewhere.182 This is a universal issue that 
applies well beyond pharmaceutical patents and it does not admit any easy 
resolution. Sometimes, so-called ‘dodgy’ patents will be brought to heel, but in 
other instances they will be granted and may exert an unwarranted dissuasive 
effect.  
Granting secondary patents of the method of use or administration type also 
brings up once more the thorny issue of whether methods of medical treatment 
should be patentable. It seems clear that there is at least some level of underlying 
judicial discomfort in relation to patents of this character, especially those with 
no apparent substantive merit. However, given the majority authority on the 
patentability of such claims, the safest primary mode of attack on such patents 
will presumably remain on the grounds of novelty, inventiveness, and other core 
requirements of patentability beyond the threshold question of ‘manner of new 
manufacture’, which by and large continues to be whittled down on many fronts 
to its ‘core residuum’. 183  Even attacks on inventiveness are likely to prove 
problematic, especially if the more robust approaches of lower courts are 
overturned on appeal. 
 
181 Steve Lewis, ‘FTA Drug Safeguard at Risk’, The Australian (Sydney), 3 January 2006, 1. 
182 See, eg, Arup, above n 84, 226. 
183 See Warwick A Rothnie, The New Law of Patents (17 August 2005) IPwar’s Patents 
<http://homepage.mac.com/wrothnie/iblog/C149316833/E883935307/index.html>, which refers 
to the position taken by Finkelstein J on the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, 23 
Jac 1, c 3, in Faulding (2000) 97 FCR 524. 
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Given the limited term of patent duration, the patent system is, at least theo-
retically, of a fundamentally deciduous character. However, in practice, a 
constantly replanted patent thicket can appear the biological equivalent of an 
evergreen. Over time we should expect to see the shade provided by such cover 
deepen rather than lessen. The ever-increasing reach of the proprietarian trend in 
intellectual property seems set to continue, with evergreening practices in 
relation to drug patents being merely one example. In terms of end results, not all 
such instances of extended protection will be inimical to downstream innovation 
and health costs, but it is hard to envisage a future without instances of abuse. 
